Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary
Judgments
David P. Curriet
Directed verdicts and summary judgments are two useful tools
of modern civil procedure for truncating the normal trial procedure
in jury cases. Both are surrounded by unnecessary confusion and the
relationship between the two seems poorly understood. My aim is
to clarify, simplify, and improve them.
I.

DIRECTED VERDICTS

In "actions at common law," issues of historical fact, and some
applications of law to fact (for example, negligence) are ordinarily
left to jury decision upon request of either party. This practice represents in part a conviction that on such matters the judge's legal
training gives him no special competence and that the collective
judgment of persons relatively representative of the community is
preferable. Yet we do not allow the jury complete freedom even on
these issues, and for good reason. To permit a jury to find the facts
contrary to overwhelming evidence, or upon wholly insufficient evidence, would license juries to undermine the law.
Thus, modern practice permits the judge to direct a verdict, or
to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, if on the evidence
presented "there can be but one conclusion . . . that reasonable

men could have reached."' On its face this standard appears highly
subjective but straightforward: the judge is not to substitute his
judgment for that of the jury; he is not to intervene except in extreme cases; but he is to see to it that the jury does not abuse its
power. For example, one might think that the rule stated above
would not permit a jury to find a traffic light green if forty bishops
testified it was not, or a debt unpaid in the face of a signed receipt
without evidence of fraud or the like. But the familiar textbook case
of Simblest v. Maynard2 shows that the rule is by no means as
simple as it appears.

Simblest referred to three divergent tests for determining
whether a jury could reasonably find for the party against whom the
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970).
2 Id.
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motion for a directed verdict is made. The judge may consider: 1)
all the evidence; 2) only the evidence favorable to the party moved
against; or 3) both the evidence favorable to the party moved
against and the evidence favoring the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached. On the second test, taken literally, a
jury would be allowed to disbelieve the unopposed testimony of forty
bishops and to ignore the unimpeached receipt. Under the third
standard, the contrary testimony of the adverse party would preclude a directed verdict in the same cases. Indeed, if the trial judge
must always disregard evidence favoring the moving party, he may
never direct a verdict for the party with the burden of proof on the3
issue unless the facts are admitted. And some courts have so held.
It is, to put it gently, difficult to reconcile such results either with
the rule that juries may not act unreasonably or with the underlying
policy of preventing juries from undermining the law.
Often cited 4 as authority for looking only to the evidence favoring the party moved against is the Supreme Court's opinion in
Wilkerson v. McCarthy,5 which flatly says that this is the
"established rule." No citations or reasons accompany this statement. Just a few years before, the Court had explicitly considered
evidence favoring the moving party in Pennsylvania Railroad v.
Chamberlain.' And the statement in Wilkerson was quite unnecessary to the result. On the disputed factual question whether employees customarily walked across a narrow board over a pit, there was
testimony of approximately equal weight on each side; on any test,
a jury could reasonably have found either way.
One possible explanation of the Wilkerson dictum lies in the
fact that Wilkerson was an action under the Federal Employers
Liability Act.7 Supreme Court pronouncements on the jury's role in
such cases have sometimes been distinguished on the thinly disguised ground that the Court allows the jury in an F.E.L.A. case to
nullify a negligence requirement with which it has no sympathy.' As
Judge Rives has said, however,9 there is nothing either in the Act
or in the Supreme Court decisions interpreting it to suggest that a
See Sunderland, Directinga Verdict for the PartyHaving the Burden of Proof,11 MICH.
L. REv. 198 (1913), and cases cited.
See, e.g., Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1970).
5 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949).
1 288 U.S. 333 (1933).
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
E.g., Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 370-73 (5th Cir. 1969) (F.E.L.A. requires
only "slight negligence," which played "any part" in harming the employee).
9 Id. at 384-92 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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special standard should apply. Indeed, there is some question
whether the seventh amendment permits a less exacting degree of
judicial supervision in some cases than in others. Justice Frankfurter has argued that appropriate judicial control is one aspect of
the jury trial guaranteed by the Constitution.'0 In any event, the
policy of jury nullification is antithetical to the policy assumptions
on which the reasonable juror standard is based and logically calls
for abandonment of all judicial control over juries. If this is the
reason for limiting the evidence a judge may consider in passing on
a motion for a directed verdict, the Wilkerson test is an arbitrary
halfway measure.
But despite Wilkerson's departure from recent Supreme Court
practice, the test it announced was clearly not an unprecedented
F.E.L.A. innovation. The Court utilized a similar test as long ago
as 1837, in Ewing v. Burnet," and it gave a reason for doing so. The
action was for ejectment. The defendant asserted adverse possession, and the plaintiff countered that the defendant had prior notice
of his title. The denial of the plaintiff's request for a peremptory
instruction was affirmed. The Court reasoned that because credibility was a matter for the jury, the judge must assume in ruling on
the motion that the plaintiff's witnesses were lying and the defendant's were not; although there was nothing to contradict the plaintiff's evidence of notice, the jury might disbelieve it. 2 This explanation would limit the Wilkerson rule to cases in which the evidence
to be ignored is testimonial, for there is no question of the credibility
of a written receipt, although, as Professor Sutherland has pointed
out,'3 the authenticity of such a document may itself depend upon
oral testimony. But the South Dakota Supreme Court's answer to
this position, quoted favorably by Wigmore,' 4 seems compelling: "A
jury has no greater or better right to act arbitrarily or unreasonably
in forming a judgment or opinion as to whether or not a witness
speaks the truth than it has to act unreasonably in arriving at any
other opinion or conclusion."' 5
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. at 64-65 (concurring opinion).
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41 (1837).
12 Id. at 51. Judge Learned Hand argued that this position was logically sound but ruled
that its adoption would unduly constrict judicial control of juries. Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d
962, 964 (2d Cir. 1930).
13Sunderland, supra note 3, at 206.
119 J. WiOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2405 (3d ed. 1940) (citing Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, 54
S.D. 446, 223 N.W. 585 (1929)).
11Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, 54 S.D. 446, 459-60, 223 N.W. 585, 590-91 (1929). It is
true that an appellate court is in no position to review a trial judge's evaluation of witness
demeanor, but that does not seem to me to justify giving the jury power to act unreasonably.
"
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Thus if we begin with the premise that the directed verdict is
a device to keep juries from acting unreasonably, any limitations on
what evidence the judge may consider appear highly artificial. However, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Galloway v.
United States'6 suggests that the premise itself may be historically
and thus constitutionally unsound. When the seventh amendment
was adopted, according to Justice Black, there were but two vehicles
for interfering with the jury on account of insufficient evidence: the
motion for new trial and the demurrer to the evidence. Any substantial expansion of judge control beyond these precedents would in his
view contravene the amendment." Galloway was not specifically
concerned with the question whether the judge may look at all the
evidence, but the Black principle has important implications for
that issue. The new trial practice cannot justify the direction of a
verdict, which has the far more severe consequence of terminating
the case on the merits. The demurrer to the evidence did result in
a final judgment, but to make it a defendant waived his right to
offer evidence and admitted the facts the plaintiff's evidence tended
to prove.'" If the modern directed verdict cannot differ substantially
from this precedent, it follows that the judge must disregard any
evidence-even documentary-introduced by the moving party.
This test differs slightly from that of Wilkerson, which focuses not
upon who introduced the evidence but upon whom it favors; but it
is very close.
The majority decision in Galloway, however, decisively rejected
the thesis that the boundaries of the obsolete demurrer to the evidence confine the directed verdict of today.' Eighteenth-century
practice essentially forbade a jury to act upon speculation as a substitute for proof. The Court reasoned that the amendment did not
freeze the details of that practice; in particular, it did not require
the Court to follow 1791 precedents in determining whether "any
evidence" rather than "substantial evidence" of a disputed fact was
sufficient to put the issue to the jury. This reasoning seems to justify
a departure from the old rule that on demurrer to the evidence only
the evidence of the party moved against is considered. Indeed the
Court suggested as'much in dictum: "It may be doubted that the
Amendment requires challenge to an opponent's case to be made
without reference to the merits of one's own and at the price of all
319 U.S. 372 (1943).
" Id. at 396-407 (Black, J., dissenting).
' See F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
"

319 U.S. at 388-95.

234 (2d ed. 1977).
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opportunity to have it considered."2 Galloway opens the door to a
rational system of jury supervision based upon the policy of keeping
juries from acting unreasonably. This sound policy has the sanction
of Supreme Court cases prior to Wilkerson, and the contrary conclusion in that opinion was mere dictum. I therefore urge that in passing upon motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding
the verdict federal judges consider all the evidence, 2 and that rule
50(a) 2 be amended to make this clear.
IT.

SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) summary judgment may be granted, without trial, on the basis of affidavits, depositions, and other materials showing "that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to relief
as a matter of law.1 2 The purpose of the summary judgment device
is to ascertain whether the parties have evidence justifying the bur24
den of a trial.
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co.5 the Supreme Court reversed a
summary judgment for the defendant because the materials supporting the motion failed to disprove an alleged conspiracy to deny
civil rights. The Court strongly suggested in dictum that an uncontroverted affidavit denying the conspiracy allegations would have
required the opposite result. The holding confines the summary
judgment procedure so narrowly as to impair its effectiveness, while
the dictum expands it far enough to threaten the right to jury trial.
The dictum finds nominal support in the 1963 amendment to
rule 56(e) that the party against whom summary judgment is sought
''may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading"
but must "set forth the specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. 2 But if a jury would be free to disbelieve an uncontradicted witness at trial, as is sometimes the case, 27 to grant summary judgment for a party having the burden of proof on the basis
21

Id. at 392.

21 1 do not mean to resolve here the question whether state or federal law governs this

issue in diversity cases. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969).
22 FED.
2

FED.

21 See

R. Civ. P. 50(a).
R. Civ. P. 56(c).

F.

JAMES

& G.

HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE

219-21 (2d ed. 1977); Corwin v. Los

Angeles Newspaper Serv. Bureau Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 842, 851, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785, 790, 484 P.2d
953, 958 (1971).
-5 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
27 E.g., Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 22 N.J. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956); see Bobbe,
The Uncontradicted Testimony of an Interested Witness, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 33 (1934).
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of an affidavit embodying such a witness's testimony would infringe
the right to jury trial guaranteed by the seventh amendment,2s the
Rules Enabling Act,2 9 and federal rules themselves." Rule 56(e) does
not require such a result; by its terms, the consequence of a failure
to file counter-affidavits is that summary judgment shall be granted
"if appropriate." 31 The holding of Adickes itself makes clear that
summary judgment is to be denied even in the absence of a response
unless the moving party's showing is adequate in itself to justify the
relief sought. "[If appropriate" means if the test for summary
judgment is met, that is, if the materials on file show that the
moving party is entitled to relief.
This conclusion is confirmed by the notes of the Advisory Committee. The 1963 amendment was designed to reverse a line of decisions refusing summary judgment, in the face of a strong evidentiary
showing, simply on the basis of contrary allegations in the pleadings. The Committee emphasized that the amendment was not
meant to dispense with the need for such a showing: "Where the
evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the
absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even
if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented. 3 2 Indeed the Committee expressly addressed the issue of credibility: when a material
issue "cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of
witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility, summary judgment
is not appropriate." 33 Thus rule 56 as well as the enabling statute
and the Constitution forbids the entry of summary judgment unless
the evidence before the court would justify a directed verdict if
presented at trial. To the extent the Adickes dictum suggests the
contrary, it should not be followed.
The actual holding of Adickes, however, leans too far in the
opposite direction. The defendant's crucial omission, according to
the Court, was its failure to deny that a policeman had been in the
store; if a policeman had been present, a jury might reasonably have
inferred that he had conspired with the clerk to refuse the plaintiff
U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ...."
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) provides: "Such rules ... shall preserve the right of trial by
jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution."
FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) provides: "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."
1,FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), Advisory Committee Notes (1963), 31 F.R.D. 648 (1963).
3

Id.
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service." The inference itself appears strained enough, but the striking fact is that there was no evidence before the Court suggesting a
policeman was in the store. At trial the plaintiff would have had the
burden of production and persuasion on the conspiracy issue, so on
the record she would have suffered a directed verdict. Yet summary
judgment was held improper because, in contrast to the situation
at trial, the burden was on the defendant to show the absence of a
genuine issue of fact. Some courts and commentators have carried
this idea to the extreme of treating the moving party in such a case
as though he were being required to discharge the burden of production or even persuasion at trial. 5
This reasoning is based on the ambiguous requirement of rule
56(c) that the materials on file "show. . .that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment"3 and the statement of the Advisory Committee that the movant's evidentiary materials must "establish the
absence of a genuine issue." This statement does indeed suggest
that even a party with the burden of proof may avoid a summary
judgment without producing any evidence unless his opponent
makes a strong evidentiary showing. This conclusion, however, undermines the purpose of the rule, which is to discover whether the
parties have enough evidence to justify the time and expense of a
trial. Professor Louis, while criticizing the more extreme manifestations of the movant's burden on this ground, insists that the moving
party, if he would not have the burden of proof at trial, make a
showing that would justify a jury verdict in his favor if he had:
anything less would allow harassment of the opposing party. 37 This
fear seems unfounded, for discovery can require far more burdensome disclosure, and the evidence must in any event be prepared
for trial. Thus the Adickes dictum that an uncontradicted affidavit
asserting the policeman's absence would have justified summary
judgment seems correct in policy but not, as the Court intimated,
because such an affidavit would have foreclosed a jury finding that
a policeman was in the store. Rather, although a jury might have
been entitled to disbelieve the arguably interested testimony of a
policeman or of a store employee, its doing so would nevertheless
have left the plaintiff subject to a directed verdict for failure to
satisfy her burden of proof.38
398 U.S. at 158.
See authorities cited in Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical
Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 752 (1974).
:'FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
3'Louis, supra note 35 at 749-50.
31 Cases following the rule that disbelief of testimony will not serve as proof of facts
'3
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The purpose of rule 56 requires that summary judgment be
granted if and only if the evidence before the court would justify a
directed verdict if presented at trial. 9 Consequently, the rule should
be amended to make clear that a motion for summary judgment,
without more, puts an opposing party with the burden of proof to
the task of producing evidence sufficient to sustain a favorable verdict.
contrary to that testimony are collected in J.
MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE

MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J.
998-99 (6th ed. 1973).

"' That the judge has not yet seen the demeanor of the witnesses should make him more
hesitant to enter summary judgement than to direct a verdict whenever there is any chance
that demeanor might detract from the compelling nature of the written evidence.

